TCP/IP Network Security - Portland State University

TCP/IP Network Security - Portland State University

Network Security - Firewalls Jim Binkley Portland State University 1 outline (more like high points) intro network design ACLs cisco ipfw

proxy servers (e.g., tis) other mechanisms, socks, tcpwrappers, IDSen, Linux iptables Portland State University 2 bibliography Inet Firewalls FAQ: Ranum/Curtin Building Internet Firewalls Chapman/Zwicky, ORA book, 2nd edition Practical Unix & Internet Security

Garfinkel/Spafford, ORA, 2nd edition, 1996 Firewalls and Internet Security Bellovin/Cheswick, Addison-Wesley, 1994 Portland State University 3 why firewalls? you have 1000 WNT 4.0 hosts/servers winnuke appears on the planet what do you do patch 1000 WNT boxes?

and restore all the apps ... block winnuke at the firewall? disable Inet access to the WNT boxes? nothing (call your lifeline?) Portland State University 4 policy you need to decide what you want to protect and inventory what you are doing (email/web/modems/ NFS/distributed database) then decide how to protect it

wall it off (firewalls ...) throw it away improve authentication (one-time keys ...) use XYZZY to solve all known problems Portland State University 5 theoretically policy should be top-down write it and implement it

often bottom-up evaluate current practice and improve it especially may happen post disaster Portland State University 6 no silver bullet no matter what the firewall vendors say ... Portland State University 7 assume ipsec, M. got what? IPipsec

SEC Portland State University 8 security is based on trust/risk as well as security tools assume: perfect Inet-wide IPSEC does this mean perfect security ? no ... you still have to trust the other side or the other

network (engineers) or your employees a single VPN or firewall by itself does not give cross Inet security you still have to trust the people and have sane security processes/practices Portland State University 9 firewall not enough because social engineering attacks

Im from IT and I need General BigNecks password lack of physical security for computer console can you say L1-A? secrets in the dumpster secrets on the floppies secretary mails business plan to alt.general employees have found real-video South Park site this could be a real problem if you are in the cartoon biz Portland State University

10 end-to-end thesis and firewalls they disrupt end to end transport relationship as does NAT as does QOS (ahhh ... but we have soft state) implicit tie to fate-sharing is true hope is for world without firewalls this is not a practical hope ... Portland State University

11 firewall/IDS basic ideas stateless vs stateful stateful means connection table IDS may have it, FW may have it, NAT stop a moment and define packet flow Portland State University

12 our friend the packet IP hdr ip src, ip dst, next proto UDP/TCP/ICMP,ESP, TCP/UDP hdr well known/dynamic ports how useful are they? TCP flags Portland State University

13 the relationship between errors and L4 TCP SYNs to empty port gets TCP reset plus some ICMP errors UDP packet to empty port gets ICMP unreachable firewalls may use this or abuse it great firewall of China syn spoofing plus resets (IPS)

Portland State University 14 flows a MESS of packets from IP src to IP dst from IP src -> IP dst with ESP IP src, L4 src -> IP dst, L4 dst TCP,UDP when does it stop (how do you clock it?) probably with a state table and a timer

STATE needed for stateful firewalls, router flow optimization, NAT, IDS systems note that L7 info may be lost or unavailable this mechanism may be about information aggregation Portland State University 15 flow example 131.252.X.Y, port 1024 -> google IP, port 80, TCP, syn | fin | 12 packets, 1400 bytes

google IP, port 80 -> 131.252.X.Y port 1024, etc (reverse flow) 131.252.X.Y, port 6666 -> random IP, port 6666, 1 packet 131.252.X.Y, port 6667 -> random IP, port 6666, 1 packet 131.252.X.Y. port 6668 -> random IP, port 6666, 1 packet Portland State University 16 flows found in: Cisco netflow tools (NFSen, cflow, silktools, etc). network traffic mgmt, security possible

Snort goal it to capture connections and make connection state decisions for IDS, as opposed to per packet NAT/stateful firewalls allows smart decisions about what gets in or gets out might be able to block syn scanning Portland State University 17 intro

firewalls control access - one or more machines that constrain access to an internal network firewalls may allow you to implement rulebased policies and act as choke point (moat and drawbridge with guard tower) - centralize admin dont serve to ENABLE but DISABLE just say no ... Portland State University 18 Chapman/Zwicky definition Firewall:

A component ... that restricts access between a protected network and the Internet ... note: restricts does not mean enables security reality-check: just say no its harder than it looks fundamental test of management support does not support programmer add one more feature Portland State University 19 choke point means logging

allow you to monitor/log what is going on you can watch one place better than 1000 places you may not be able to log everything or log sufficient with lower-level tools like ACL-based systems in routers proxy/host-based/apps better at this Portland State University 20 2+2 kinds of firewalls access-control-list mechanisms; i.e., packet

filters at network layer typically in routers (NLC), but may be found in hosts (ipfw, etc., e.g., in Linux/freebsd) application-level gateways, proxy server bastion host typically has such a service TIS firewall toolkit classic example Portland State University 21 two more possible forms (subforms) stateful packet systems e.g., stateful inspection use state machine so you can learn what to expect in

terms of response e.g., ftp out means ftp connect back in e.g., dns out means dns from X back in circuit proxy - use TCP, and talk to server that turns around and acts as client good for logging/acl control, no content understand for a protocol Portland State University 22 in general, stack-wise application-layer, proxy/circuit transport network, packet, stateless/stateful

Portland State University 23 some example systems access lists - major router vendors/Cisco/Bay/etc. even hosts - linux/freebsd have ipfw mechanism + NAT bastion host/TIS FW Toolkit runs on UNIX platforms gauntlet is commercial version

stateful inspection Checkpoint/Cisco PIX Portland State University 24 some buzzwords bastion host - system that is made more secure due to Internet exposure, typically workstation

screened host/network - host or network behind firewall/router, amount of protection depends on rules in firewall. said router is a screening router. perimeter network/DMZ - network (often internal) between internal secure nets and outside world secure enclave - what you get with perimeter-based security (secure all the exits/entrances) defense in depth - the notion that in addition to firewall one, you have host protection and internal firewalls, etc. Portland State University 25 etc. victim system or goat system experimental and sacrificial maybe they are all victim systems?

intrusion detection - looking for bad guys having landed (or little people?) may take a number of forms packet analysis, tripwire, log scanning, virus scans may be regarded as defense in depth technique may be regarded as internal defense technique Portland State University 26 more ... honeypot - system or program on server that looks exploitable but may actually serve as advanced warning

intrusion detection system makes sense to put on bastion host learn the motives, techniques, etc. of attackers nepenthes - Portland State University 27 firewall architectures 1st of all - consider access to internal enclave systems do they get to talk to Inet (and vice versa) do they come in two classes (those that can and those that cant) of course - no outside access is safer ...

some possible firewall architectures follow Portland State University 28 user systems can get out but bad guys are restricted getting in? ordinary user system ordinary users can talk out Portland State University cannot connect in-bound to servers or maybe hosts

or perhaps outside systems can only return your call? 29 users cannot get out period and vice versa outside host ordinary user system bastion host firewall (obviously) internal user systems cannot talk or be talked to from outside world - only through intermediary Portland State University

30 arch #1, which can still vary internally depending on fw the outside the firewall and/or proxy server or nat ethernet mr. user box Portland State University 31 silver bullet firewall picture packet filter/router firewall engine

because he has a T1 or T3 ... and that firewall box is a sparc/pc ... protects everything internal interior networks Portland State University 32 some scenarios

a freebsd/linux pc, with proxy servers (email/web), possibly using host firewalling (acls) as well and/or NAT its a cisco router with acls only its an expensive firewall box the user host may or may not have access to the outside world (e.g., might only have proxy access to web/email) two box scenario - router can protect firewall with acls ... (cant telnet to it from outside world ...) Portland State University 33 cont. dual-homed host with proxy not unusual does not allow routing across

fairly secure/cheap solution although there are cons may be impossible with fancy WAN plumbing hard disk is always a con in 7x24 access system Portland State University 34 note: cheaper WAN router may look like this (cisco 26xx series) to Inet, serial port company web server (ext.)v internal protected nets two ethernet ports, 1 wan port Portland State University out of box...

35 note to network engineers the infrastructure has to be protected too the routers/switches snmp writes ... the firewall is part of the infrastructure if land succeeds on cisco router/switch or brand X firewall that is not a GOOD thing ... Portland State University 36

arch model #2 (classic) exterior router DMZ network internal network and screening router email gateway (bastion host) Portland State University ordinary hosts 37 may have 2nd perimeter router put bastion hosts on DMZ subject to attack by definition

allow access to host X for TCP and port 25 (email) wall off interior hosts via 2nd network/router that does screening attacker can attack bastion host and then interior host, but not interior host directly Portland State University 38 packet filters

typically associated with network layer/routing function (but peek at transport headers) use IP src/dst, protocol type, tcp/udp src/dst ports, IP encapsulation types (ICMP, IPIP) router knows i/f packet arrived on or is trying to escape on can understand IP networks as well as IP host addresses should be able to log denys Portland State University 39

pros/cons pros large scale tool - can turn off all telnet access or all access to subnet X or to proto Y can deal with NEW service because it doesnt know about it (KISS because per packet decision) more efficient than application gateway cons logging is harder because you may not have app/protocol knowledge (no state machine) getting rule base right for ALL protocols is tricky especially if accept all, deny some is policy basis Portland State University

40 new kid on the block stateful inspection basically packet filters that are smarter and look at connection state (tcp or udp) e.g., can easily setup so that no internal access is allowed outside in external access is allowed inside out state: TCP out means expect TCP back in

perhaps easy to teach about new protocols Portland State University 41 policy considerations start with: deny all, permit a few pro: most paranoid/proscriptive/most secure con: cost to getting anything accomplished is the most high pro: less need to react to latest hacker discovery

start with: allow all; deny a few (known bad) pro: least impact on Internet traffic con: least secure, + need to stay up to date on hackerdom Portland State University 42 Example: deny all; allow a few no Internet traffic allowed to/from internal hosts except for proxies (application control gates) proxies include:

web proxy (easy/apache) email proxy (easy/sendmail by definition) telnet proxy ftp proxy Portland State University 43 Example: allow all; deny a few

no IP spoofing (pkts leaving/entering must have IP src that make sense) no private IP addresses no directed broadcast no IP authentication-based protocols lpr, X, nfs, rlogin, rsh no Microsoft TCP/NetBEUI (137-139) Portland State University 44 Cisco acl example from Inet Firewalls FAQ

serial/wan connection to Inet ze router net is ethernet0 bastion host, email/dns Portland State University 45 but first, acl basics

executed in order of list entries on a packet default deny at end basic form: permit ip src-net src-mask dst-net dst-mask eq port permit or deny, log may appear at end access-list 101 permit ip mask sets bits for bits to ignore, therefore above means 172.16.X.X (any hosts in 172.16) net/mask may be replaced with any or host Portland State University

46 Cisco deny all ACL example no ip source-route interface ethernet0 ip address no ip directed-broadcast interface serial0 ip access-group 101 in

access-list 101 deny ip access-list 101 permit tcp any any established access-list 101 permit tcp any host eq smtp access-list 101 permit tcp any host eq dns access-list 101 permit udp any host eq dns Portland State University 47 Cisco acl, cont.

access-list 101 deny tcp any any range 6000 6003 access-list 101 deny tcp any any eq 2049 access-list 101 deny udp any any eq 2049 access-ist 101 permit tcp any 20 any gt 1024 (note: ftp data connections from 20) access-list 101 permit icmp any any IMPLICIT DENY AT END OF LIST Portland State University 48 Cisco ACL, cont.

snmp-server community FOOBAR RO 2 line vty 0 4 access-class 2 in access-list 2 permit note: above allows snmp access from inside only and telnet access to router from inside only Portland State University 49 egress filter on serial interface or input on ethernet interface interface ethernet0 ip access-group 102 in

access-list 102 permit our-ip our-mask any access-list 102 deny ip any any thus no non-home packets in terms of ip src allowed out (hard on Mobile-IP) basic DOS mitigation Portland State University 50 and now a word from Fergie

BCP 38 ingress filters private IPs (net 10, and yourself coming in) egress filters private IP addresses and not yourself going out 2 questions: 1. when does this help 2. what about bogon lists? Portland State University 51

bogon lists and other things that go bump in the night 1. Cymru has nice list of unused net blocks and private Ips you know about 169.254/16 right? agg.txt there are other more aggressive lists for evil Portland State University 52

RBLs and C/Cs has 3 lists (mail servers) 1. SBL - spam block list 2. XBL - xploits block list 3. PBL - list of hosts that should not be doing email (policy block list) OR suitable for snort Portland State University 53

cisco acl handout time more elaborate allow all deny a few deny all allow a few note mixture is possible next look at FreeBSD ipfw (from FreeBSD handbook) similar to linux ipchains Portland State University 54 host acl example - FreeBSD ipfw

kernel must be configured with: options IPFIREWALL # ipfw on options IPFIREWALL_VERBOSE # logging options IPFIREWALL_DEFAULT_TO_ACCEPT note: default deny can lead to damaged feet; i.e., be very sure the acl will allow you to access the box ipfw defaults to deny all ... otherwise IPFIREWALL_VERBOSE_LIMIT=10 limits logging on a per entry basis

Portland State University 55 ipfw toolkit simple packet filter also accounting stats for ip could be used as end host or for BSD-based router of course ipfw(8) utility is used for setting up rules command categories include: addition/deletion, listing, flushing, clearing

flushing means wipe rules, clearing wipe accounting stats Portland State University 56 ipfw ipfw [-N] command [index] action [log] protocol addresses [options] -N - resolve addresses and services in output

commands: add, delete index specifies where in the chain (the list of rules) a rule goes, default is the end default rule is index 65535, deny if log specified the rule is logged Portland State University 57 ipfw actions: reject - drop and send ICMP host/port unreachable error allow - pass it of course deny - drop it, no ICMP count - count it, but dont accept/deny

protocols all/icmp/tcp/udp Portland State University 58 ipfw address from

[port] to

[port] via port can only be used with tcp/udp via is optional and may be IP/dns or interface name (ed0), ppp* would match all ppp ports address/mask-bits or address:mask-pattern mask-pattern is ip address

any may be used for any ip address Portland State University 59 ipfw options frag - matches if packet is not the first fragment of datagram in - matches if the packet is input out - matches if the packet is headed out ipoptions -- for ip options established - matches if TCP established state setup - TCP syn tcpflags - specific tcp flag bits icmptypes - specific icmp messages

Portland State University 60 ipfw commands ipfw l # list ipfw -a l # accounting counters too ipfw -t l # last match times for each rule ipfw -N l # dns resolve desired ipfw flush # wipe the chain ipfw zero [index] # zero stats Portland State University

61 examples if we were a router: ipfw add deny log tcp from to 23 ipfw add deny tcp from any to setup deny all but allow web server traffic ipfw add allow tcp from any to 80

Portland State University 62 FreeBSD note: log in vain sysctl -w net.inet.tcp.log_in_vain=1 sysctl -w net.inet.udp.log_in_vain=1 logs external accesses to ports that do not have servers primitive intrusion detection system ? what do I do if something shows up ? be able to think on your feet ...

Portland State University 63 application considerations we will look at some app behavior situations tcp/udp port considerations if you deny all, you might want to make an exception (accept all, you might want to make an exception to deny it ...) telnet/ftp/X-11/real audio Sun rpc services (ouch ...)

Portland State University 64 client/server telnet model telnet client telnetd/telnet server TCP-based ip = port=1025 (1024 and up) Portland State University ip= port=23 (well known) 65

ftp - non-passive-mode client (port 1024) connects to TCP port 21 port 1025 ftp client port 20 server connects back per file xfer ftpd/server in passive mode, ftp client connects to server Portland State University 66 X11 client (port 1024) connects to TCP port 6000..X

xterm (or whatever) client Portland State University X/server/display 67 real audio client (port 1024) connects to TCP port 554/7070 UDP 6970-7170 gui app (or whatever) client Portland State University ra server

68 Sun RPC portmapper - program #/tied to udp/tcp ports portmapper lives at port 111 (block ...) example attack: buffer overflow on rpc.statd NFS parts like mountd theoretically move around (they register with portmap at boot and get a port) NSF parts like nfsd do NOT move around (2049) rpc is painful and dangerous in terms of acl-firewalls Sun has had shadows ports > 32k (ouch)

Portland State University 69 study questions go thru previous 5 app slides and DOS attacks previously studied use acls to alternatively try to kill it (deny) enable it with everything else killed what problems exist? also ask the ?: what makes this particular app less

secure? and what can we do about it? Portland State University 70 issues for firewalls not too different from routers in some ways

e.g., redundancy, what about load balancing? o.s. that firewall is on should be MORE bullet proof than average lack of hard disk may be GOOD thing logging u/i is very important clues about how it works important too but ... may be hard to get how well does it route? (maybe you dont want it to route ...) Portland State University 71 more issues for firewalls

you bought an expensive firewall system that runs on a UNIX workstation what services if any does it allow through that they didnt tell you about? how do you find out? (nmap ...) lets say you let in port 111 for tcp to box X? what else could go wrong? (e.g., how are application proxies in one way better than packet filters?) consider the back-channel attacks or ftp on port 12345 Portland State University 72 acl cons

port-filtering with HOLES (allow all) is hard and problematic must know previous holes latest bug on bugtraq - you need to know about it and fix the firewall you block web access on the lower ports but user sets up proxy server outside on port 7777 and redirects their internal netscape to use it can be tricky if rule list is complex con for really high-speed networking (sigh) pro compared to proxy in terms of speed Portland State University 73

proxy services/bastion hosts bastion host - IDEALLY one per service NO user logins - users can bring their own programs with them web proxy server email proxy server (easy) anonymous ftp server cut down on all other ways to attack interior hosts rlogin is a bad idea ... or lpd ... or NFS Portland State University 74 please read this slide

once more: NFS (rpc.statd or whatever buffer overflow of the day) is a bad idea on a bastion host/proxy firewall so is Usoft CIFS (lets share the password file by accident, what say?) does this mean that a Cisco router with ACLS is better? (than a sloppily setup bastion host?) - no NFS (fingerd though) Portland State University 75 you must have a brain ...

Portland State University 76 proxy service may require user to use a certain procedure (ftp to box X, then ftp out) OR set netscape client to point at X, port 8080 a particular proxy service can be good at logging and offer better granularity access control may try and filter viruses, java applets, but

usually virus stuff left to virus scanners may require modified CLIENT software Portland State University 77 proxy services pros finer grain control over applications understand the protocol and harder to spoof better logging as deny all, more secure by definition cons

need new code if something new comes along cant do everything (proxy NFS is a weird idea?) have to be careful with bastion host setup slower than packet acl mechanism Portland State University 78 proxy services - examples TIS Toolkit individual proxies for common apps telnet client to TIS/box X, get prompt that allows you to telnet out only

cant store files locally ftp proxy generic proxy called plug-gw specify limited range of addresses/ports, use with NNTP Portland State University 79 TIS, cont. http-gw: http/gopher proxy x-gw: X gateway may be bad idea as X not very secure Portland State University

80 circuit proxy - SOCKS originally TCP connections-only, and a redirection/circuit protocol need a socks server and socks-ified clients socks client library for UNIX boxes e.g., socks apps like telnet/ftp clients talk to socks server rather than real world not protocol specific, logging is generic

access control by host/protocol now may redirect ports at will Portland State University 81 incomplete list of proxy server functions web proxy - restrict outside access cant visit EVIL web pages (AUP function) cache fw restriction outside in as well socks(alike) proxy

turn email into encrypted http over port 80 in so email in to email out (spam function) possible form of remote control socks may allow you to bypass the web proxy may make access to rest of Inet anonymous Portland State University 82 socks - as anonymous tool socks/out to socks server on to Inet isnt this a VPN?

note: http to http (IP address is socks server) OR: socks to email (IP address is socks server) Portland State University 83 how about this topology though? remote employee windows box socks/vpn socks server windows file server Portland State University 84 proxy servers may be open or closed

closed means needs password open means go on through question though: if open, does it mean open by accident if open, is it watched (a honeypot) can it just be open and be for free? (yes) although more complex, see TOR project: (and now for the chaffing protocol) Portland State University 85 wrappers and tcpwrappers

basic idea: maybe we dont have source ... security logic in one program encapsulates another program (which can be updated without typically breaking the paradigm) one wrapper may be able to deal with multiple wrappees ... examples: TIS smap wrapper for sendmail tcpwrapper by Wietse Venema socks ... Portland State University

86 tcpwrapper - Wietse Venema or at coast inetd on UNIX starts tcpwrapper thus can wrap several programs (telnet/ftp e.g.,) can be compiled into sendmail for that matter basically compares hostname/service to /etc/hosts.allow and hosts.deny files to determine if service is allowed logs results in syslog (you can log finger for that matter)

Portland State University 87 acl mechanism search /etc/hosts.allow 1st to see if it should be allowed search /etc/hosts.deny to see if it should be denied else allow it syntax:

daemon_name: client_host_list [shell] e.g., all: note: reliance on ip addresses here may be spoofable Portland State University 88 Virtual Private Network notion firewalls may include VPNs in feature set

glue together two secure enclaves with a virtual secure pipe; i.e., packets have crypto e.g., use confidentiality/authentication for all packets between routers A and routers B across the Inet of interest to businesses with private telco networks to connect their office dialup access too firewalls are beginning to have this feature Portland State University 89 Virtual Private Network Internet net 1 router

crypto net 2 all pkts from net 1 to net 2 subject to authentication/confidentiality (and vice versa) Portland State University 90 VPNs

mechanisms extent include: IPSEC (we will study it) Microsoft PPTP, Cisco L2TP schemes Cisco routers have IPSEC now in some versions DEC Altavista tunnel is 3rd party software solution for hosts/servers including WNT/UNIX can be integrated into firewall rule systems something like: packets from X must use IPSEC ...and either be verified on me or on bastion host Y Portland State University 91 possible general enclave design Inet this way wan router (1) insecure subnet/s 2.

bastion host 4. term mux Portland State University 3. secure subnets switches/hosts 92 explained WAN router (1) uses ACLs to protect self/bastion host (possible app-gateway or single proxy system/s)

one totally protected subnet (may not be allowed external access) exists for net console and switches (vlan net 1 ...) completely or semi-protected subnets exist for hosts, may have 2nd screening router dialup or wireless access point should be designed to be outside (possibly same ACLs ...) Portland State University 93 horrible generalization time proxy/application systems are more secure than packet-filter firewalls cant do telnet backchannel ... you must protect your infrastructure though

packet-filter firewalls are faster but are they fast enough (you have a shiny new OC-12 to the Internet and a linux host as a firewall) -- oopsie Portland State University 94 linux netfilter architecture goal is to provide

portforward redirection nat filtering netfilter is the framework various form of packet filtering, plus NAT is the outcome Portland State University 95 hook overview: kernel path for packets routing pre-routing

forward input post-routing output local process path Portland State University 96 netfilter subsystems

backwards compatible ipchains iptables packet classification system nat system connection tracking system (used by nat) Portland State University 97 Linux iptables kernel mechanism with 3 tables and possible kickout to user process 3 tables are filter, nat, mangle tables: 1. filter, default, hooks are local in (INPUT), FORWARD, local_out (OUTPUT). filter is for packet filtering (obvious...)

2. NAT, hooks at local out, prerouting, postrouting 3. mangle table (special effects), all 5 hooks now supported Portland State University 98 notes: there are three fundamental tables each table has a built-in set of chains there are three fundamental built-in chains a chain is a list of rules a rule has packet criteria (for matching) and

a target (an action) Portland State University 99 built-in chains for iptables INPUT - means a chain of rules for packets coming in to this box itself OUTPUT - means a chain of rules for locally-generated packets going out FORWARD - means a chain of rules for packets being forwarded

Portland State University 100 TARGETs include ACCEPT - accept the packet DROP - drop the packet, no icmp REJECT - drop, with icmp error (host unreachable) -reject-with can be used to specify the error QUEUE - send the packet to user-land for

processing RETURN - stop traversing this chan and resume at the next rule in the previous chain Portland State University 101 iptables basic commands # iptables [-t table] -A chain rule [options] -L - list the chains (for input/output/forward) #iptables -nL (no reverse lookup)

-A append rules to the end of a rule chain -D delete rules -I insert rules (according to a number) in the chain -R replace rules -F delete the selected chain (all if no rule given) -Z zero out counters Portland State University 102 more fundamentals for iptables command:

-N chain - create a new chain by a name -X delete a chain -P set policy for the chain to a target Portland State University 103 packet matching options -s ip/mask -d ip/mask -p tcp/udp/icmp --dport N -p tcp --dport 113 --reject-with tcp-reset -p 17 (would mean udp ... proto 17) -i and -o used for specifying interface

names (-i only with INPUT, -o with OUTPUT, both with FORWARD) Portland State University 104 some simple examples # iptables -A INPUT -p icmp -j DROP means add an input rule to drop all icmp packets # iptables -D INPUT 1 would remove that rule

# iptables -A INPUT -s -j ACCEPT # iptables -A INPUT -I 3 (rule three) ... rules go into the top by default #iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 25 -j DROP (drop SMTP packets) Portland State University 105 connection establishment

can lead to stateful inspection -m flag used here (-m state --state ) therefore can allow ftp connection from client back out to server can allow udp packet out, expecting udp reply to come back in Portland State University 106 notes on useful Linux commands netstat -natp - tells you which processes are using which tcp ports # lsof is a pan-UNIX utility for this too

netstat -naup - UDP version iptables-save and iptables-restore used to save/restore entire set of iptables commands KDE tool, knetfilter is GUI front-end Portland State University 107 one more: firewall builder tool build firewall rules for different kinds of hosts Cisco PIX/Linux iptables/BSD Portland State University 108 Linux NAT IP masquerading on linux means: we have private internal net we make all packets look like they came from the IP gateway which has real ip has 2 chains (OUTPUT is possible, but never mind):

1. PREROUTING - before routing is done Here we perform destination nat (DNAT) function input packets need IP dst set to private IP 2. POSTROUTING - where source NAT changes are done (e.g. change IP src to local gateway) Portland State University 109 examples for L NAT # iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -j SNAT --to change ip src to match

OR # iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE masquerade special SNAT, get ip from eth0 dynamically Portland State University 110 IDS overview systems exist that look for intrusions which may be defined as known attacks (you got any usoft port 80?) abnormal behavior (e.g., attack not known yet)

sys admins have looked for abnormal behavior for a long time hmmm... I wonder what the process named worm does? or scar_disk ??? Portland State University 111 a few examples packet analyzers - hooked up to promiscuous mode ethernet ports tcpdump to Internet Flight Recorder or snort or trafshow look for known attacks based on packets matched to filters (snort, IFR) arpwatch

mrtg oddly enough (or rmon, ourmon) log scanning (e.g., tcp wrapper can fit here) automated or not (ps -ax and /var/log/messages) Portland State University 112 a few examples host based - file watching

tripwire considered as good example checksum current files, and save in secure place periodically (every 24 hrs) run again, and compare results what does change mean? what do you do to secure tripwire? distributed fault finders, satan, sara, nessus, etc. look for known faults on a local network do you have an old sshd? Portland State University 113 some hard questions for these systems

lots of false positives may look for PHF (old stuff), and of course, not find new stuff (reactive, not forward thinking) distributed and heterogeneous approach is needed you have 30 switches, 5000 hosts, WNT, W98, linux, Solaris, openbsd, macintosh Portland State University 114 jails

emerging open source and commercial NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL world may use some combination of ARP/DHCP/ DNS and VLANS to put host in jail either because it was infected and caught or because we assume guilty until innocent Portland State University 115 jail #2

roughly might go like this put agent on host agent checks for virus checker agent checks for windows update, old IE agent might watch for anomalies server asks agent if host ok if not ok, stuck in evil vlan, web surfing results in message: You smell bad, get fixed then come back Portland State University 116 open source version how might this stuff go wrong? any questions? Portland State University 117 NAT with ports seen as windows firewall point is we can connect out

but they cant connect in (we hope) stateful - connection table needed packet headed out/in must be rewritten NAT by definition breaks end-end breaks IPSEC, Mobile-IP although there is an odd workaround (UDP tunnel) Portland State University 118 NAT picture Intranet NAT-capable router real address

Internet Portland State University 119 NAT workings consider and want to send a TCP syn packet to, at dst port 22, 1025 ->,22 arrives at NAT box rewritten to NATIP, free NATportn ->,22,1025->,22 becomes NATIP, NATportz->,22

this must be transparent to internet boxes NAT box maintains 5 tuple NAT tuples and must associate timeout with them note L3, L4 header munging, checksum rewrites Portland State University 120 final conclusions consider tradeoffs between ACLS and application -layer gateways (using both is ok ...) security ultimately relies on human trust and human relationships

defense in depth is good but how much is enough? security is not found in a can (weak link breaks the chain) new attack paradigms will occur ... firewalls will change. IPSEC + hybrid firewalls are new tools Portland State University 121 in spite of end-to-end hopes Firewalls will be necessary as long as software has flaws corollary: principle of isolation is not going away any time soon Jim Binkley Portland State University 122

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    UpdateCommand="UPDATE [Genre] SET [Name] = @Name, [SortOrder] = @SortOrder WHERE [Id] = @Id" Each of the parameters prefixed with the at symbol (@) is filled with the values that the GridView supplied. 7. Finally, the GridView refreshes the data on...
  • A View of Life - PC\|MAC

    A View of Life - PC\|MAC

    Monocot vs. Dicots. What are monocot and dicots? 61) Monocotyledons . have one seed leaf or monocot. Monocots also have . 1 . food source called a cotyledon. 62) Dicotyledons. have two seed leaves or dicot. Dicots also have ....

    b. Paid Leave Helps Workers Care for Themselves & Family Members (2) 73% of employees' medical reasons for taking leave was their own/family member's illness . 21% of leave related to new child, while 6% for other reasons
  • Chapter 13: Ladders

    Chapter 13: Ladders

    Use a ladder belt or a leg lock to secure yourself to the ladder. Do not attempt work from a ladder without properly securing yourself first. ... Portable ladders contain a rail, truss block, tie rod, tip, butt, butt spurs,...
  • Member Driven. Patient Focused. SB 75 Health4All Kids

    Member Driven. Patient Focused. SB 75 Health4All Kids

    Any Medi-Cal application that is started in CalHEERS and does not have an eligibility determination at the time of the transition will be adjudicated using the updated SB 75 eligibility rules. After May 16 children will be applying for full...
  • Ricardo: Integrating R and Hadoop - WPI

    Ricardo: Integrating R and Hadoop - WPI

    Amazon, eBay, Netflix, iTunes, Yahoo, Google, VISA, … User interaction data and history. Click and Transaction logs. Deep analysis. critical for competitive edge. Understanding/Modeling data. Recommendations to users. Ad placement. Challenge: Enable Deep Analysis and Understanding over massive data volumes....
  • Chapter 01

    Chapter 01

    Due ONE week from today, hand in a list of all the names of the scientists discussed in chapter 1 and the discovery that they are famous for. Look through the ENTIRE chapter. To do this assignment properly, you will...